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The ongoing financial crisis in Mexico continues to depress stock markets in most of the large South
American countries, especially Argentina and Brazil. Although none of the other nations appears
to be facing an imminent economic collapse as in Mexico, the two-month-old crisis has had a major
impact on some of the other economies, and the ripple effect of the peso devaluation will likely be
felt for a long time to come. Since the Mexican government decided to devalue the peso last Dec.
20, the value of trade on most of the large South American stock markets has declined non-stop
as nervous investors in stocks and bonds continue to sell off their holdings, fearing that Mexico's
currency crisis could trigger similar problems in the other countries (see NotiSur, 01/12/95 and
02/02/95).
A Jan. 31 US government decision to bail out Mexico by spearheading a US$50 billion emergency
loan program to shore up the peso and allow Mexico to meet its financial obligations brought
brief respite to South America's battered markets. But the lull was short-lived, since Mexico has
continued negotiating with the US and other lending institutions regarding the terms and conditions
of the loans. In fact, most investors remain wary of Mexico's willingness and ability to enforce the
rigid fiscal and monetary policies demanded by the banks, given the intense social and political
crisis that now grips Mexico (see SourceMex, 02/22/95). As a result, in February the continuing
uncertainty regarding the Mexico bailout ushered in a new wave of sell- offs by foreign investors in
stocks and bonds on South American markets.
In Argentina and Brazil, for example, the leading stock market indexes registered hefty declines
every trading day during the month of February. Since the Mexican crisis broke in December, Sao
Paulo's Bovespa index has dropped a total of 34%, and Argentina's Merval index has plunged by
nearly 39%. The Lima Stock Exchange has also fallen by about 25 points. And, even in Chile one
of the most stable economies in the region the Santiago Stock Market's leading index "IPSA" has
registered an accumulated decline of 12.62% since the beginning of the year. "There is a lot of
potential supply, but virtually no demand," said Alden Brewster, New York partner for Banco Icatu,
a Brazilian investment bank. "Speculators and bottom fishers don't want to go into what is perceived
as a crisis situation."
The plunge in trade is not just a Latin American phenomenon. Rather, the peso devaluation has
affected most emerging markets around the world, since the Mexican crisis is seen as a warning to
transfer investments back to the stable markets of the advanced industrialized countries. Moreover,
rising interest rates in the US and Europe have wiped away much of the incentive for investors to
risk their capital in developing countries. Indeed, traders now commonly joke about "submerging"
markets in developing regions. But the ripple effect of the Mexican devaluation now generally
referred to as the "tequila effect" is especially ravaging the Latin American markets, since investors
tend to view the Mexican economy as a reflection of underlying problems in most other Latin
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American countries. As a result, investors fear that similar currency crises will soon explode in the
other regional markets, leading to a scramble to sell off Latin American stocks and bonds.
"Foreign investors remain firm in their determination to eliminate Latin America from their
portfolios," said Horacio Zuniga, a prominent stock market analyst in Argentina. "The present
uncertainty has led to a collective sensation that there is no light at the end of the tunnel." So far,
none of the other Latin American countries appears in any imminent danger of economic collapse,
and despite investor fears, sudden currency devaluations and possible debt default are unlikely in
the short to medium term. Nevertheless, the tequila effect has taken a heavy toll on some South
American economies, greatly aggravating underlying economic problems and seriously curtailing
the potential for economic growth in the medium to long term.
Still, the potential consequences of the present crisis differ from country to country, and the tequila
effect must be analyzed individually. Chile, for example, is generally suffering much less than the
other two large South American economies Argentina and Brazil and Chile will likely emerge from
the present crisis fairly unscathed given that nation's sound economic policies in recent years.
Chilean economy demonstrates resilience Most of the economic imbalances that pushed Mexico
into crisis are absent in Chile. Among other things, Chile's currency is not overvalued, the country
maintains a trade surplus rather than deficit, and Chile does not rely on short- term foreign loans to
finance government spending as Mexico did before the peso devaluation.
"The economic fundamentals in Chile are much stronger than what we saw in Mexico," said
Dagnia Zeidlickis, manager of KPMG Peat Marwick's International Trade and Investment Services
in Washington DC. "Comparing Chile and Mexico is like comparing apples and oranges. Their
economic and political situations are vastly different." According to Chilean officials, Mexico lived
far beyond its means in recent years. Mexico's current account deficit snowballed from 3% of GDP
in 1990 to 8% in 1994, or about US$2.5 billion per month. The deficit was financed with highly
volatile, short-term loans by investors who rapidly withdrew their capital at the first sign of political
instability.
And, Mexico's government allowed the domestic savings rate to plunge from 20% of GDP in 1990
to just 15% in 1994. In contrast, in Chile the current account deficit remains below 1% of GDP, the
domestic savings rate has grown from 16% of GDP during the 1980s to 26% in 1994, and about 75%
of foreign investment is in the form of permanent contracts or long-term credit of five years or
more. "The Mexican crisis is affecting all emerging markets, but some more than others, and Chile
even less than most because its foreign reserves are very high, it has an elevated savings rate, and
the current account deficit is virtually insignificant," said Genaro Arriagada, Minister Secretary-
General of the Presidency. "In addition, we have avoided freezing the currency exchange at a fixed
rate with the dollar, which is what Mexico did and which is what Argentina is doing, and it is bound
to create major problems in the latter country as it did in the former."
Argentine economy slips into recession
Argentina is suffering much more than Chile from the peso crisis, largely because investors
believe that many of the underlying economic imbalances that engulfed Mexico are also present
in Argentina. Argentine currency which has been frozen on a parity with the US dollar since 1991
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is widely believed to be overvalued. Moreover, like Mexico, Argentina has registered a substantial
current account deficit in recent years, which the country has financed largely with short-term "soft
loans" from foreign investors (see NotiSur, 01/19/95). And, despite Argentina's record low inflation
last year of 3.6%, domestic and foreign investors fear the government has become lax in its fiscal
policies since late 1994, which could reignite inflation this year. Indeed, the government reported a
US$1.5 billion fiscal deficit during the second semester of 1994 the first such deficit since President
Carlos Menem's administration launched its economic stabilization plan in 1991 and the deficit is
projected to widen to between US$2 billion and US$3 billion in 1995, in part because the Menem
administration appears unwilling to reel in government spending in an election year (see NotiSur,
02/17/95).
In January, monthly inflation jumped to 1.2% the highest rate in at least 20 months and independent
economists now predict that annual inflation will edge up to 5% in 1995, reinforcing pressures to
devalue local currency. Thus, investors fear that after the May presidential elections the government
could reverse its exchange rate policy and suddenly devalue the peso which is what the Mexican
government did last December. That fear, in part, explains the plunge in Argentine stocks and
bonds in the last two months. Even if investor fears of devaluation are unfounded as the Menem
administration maintains, the steady flight of capital from the country since December will have a
major impact on the economy's growth potential in the medium to long term.
Since the peso crisis exploded, nervous Argentines and foreign investors have withdrawn more than
US$2 billion from Argentina's banks, severely straining the banking system and forcing Argentina
into an economic slowdown. Four banks and financial institutions have been forced to suspend
operations because of severe liquidity problems, which is generating a financial crunch for domestic
businesses and consumers. As a result, 1995 growth forecasts have been reduced from the 5% to 6%
level originally predicted in late 1994 to between 0% and 2% growth, at best. "Banks are delaying
payments, there is no liquidity," one local banker told The New York Times. "You have a country
that is very much dependent on foreign money, and that spigot is off." Moreover, the government
is being pushed into a fiscal bind, since it must not only attract loans to cover its projected budget
deficit this year, but must also pay off about US$5.2 billion in debt to bond holders scheduled to
come due in 1995, plus US$3.6 billion in interest. In mid- February, the Menem administration
issued US$272 million in new short-term bonds to cover its debts, but the government was forced
to offer 10.4% interest on the new bonds, compared with 7.6% interest offered on its last issue of
similar short- term bonds in November. Government officials admit that they might be forced to
turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) later this year to cover the deficit and the debts, since
soft loans are becoming too expensive. In contrast, last September the government turned down
US$400 million in loans from the IMF because it had ample access to foreign financing to cover its
obligations.
Tequila effect highlights economic imbalances in Brazil
Finally, Brazil is the other large South American country heavily affected by the peso devaluation.
As in Argentina, investors believe that the local currency, the real, is overvalued, and that the
government will eventually be forced to allow the exchange rate to slide against the US dollar to
balance the country's imports and exports and avoid financing the current account deficit with soft
loans. The government basically froze the real at a parity with the US dollar as part of the economic
stabilization plan launched in July 1994, which has allowed the country to reduce inflation from
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nearly 50% per month before July to between 2% and 3% during the second semester of 1994. But
most economists agree that the real is overvalued by a minimum of 16%, since the exchange rate
has not been adjusted to account for accumulated inflation since July. In fact, some independent
economists estimate that the real is overvalued by as much as 25%. The country's hefty foreign
reserves which reached US$43 billion at the end of December plus a huge trade surplus of US$11.5
billion in 1994, have buoyed the local currency.
However, the plunge on Brazil's stock markets since the peso crisis began, combined with a
tendency toward trade deficits in the past three months as a result of the real-dollar parity, is now
increasing the pressure to devalue local currency. The value of Brazil's huge state monopolies such
as the telecommunications firm Telebras, the federal bank Banco do Brasil, and the huge electric
utility Electrobras have plummeted on the Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo stock markets because of
the tequila effect, costing the federal government an estimated US$6 billion in accumulated losses
since December. Electrobras, for example, is now valued at US$10.75 billion, representing a 33%
plunge in value since December. Similarly, the value of Telebras had dropped by about 13% by the
end of January, and Banco do Brasil by 16%.
The drop on the stock markets plus a US$1.67 billion accumulated trade deficit for the three-
month period from November to January is rapidly eroding the country's foreign reserves. Just
since December, total reserves have fallen to US$37 billion, a drop of US$6 billion. And, unless the
government either devalues the real or takes other steps to balance imports and exports, the trade
surplus is expected to drop to just a few billion dollars by year-end 1995. In turn, the current account
deficit is expected to surge to between US$8 billion and US$10 billion this year, compared with
just US$1 billion in 1994. "We can't keep losing reserves and we can't keep showing foreign trade
deficits," warned Carlos Langoni, a former president of Brazil's Central Bank.
Still, unlike in Argentina, the scramble by foreign investors to sell off their stocks and bonds will
probably not push the Brazilian economy into recession, largely because a simultaneous surge
in productive investment is offsetting the plunge in portfolio holdings. The jump in productive
investment is generally attributed to the government's efforts to liberalize foreign investment
laws, such as reforming the constitution to permit foreigners to enter into joint ventures with
the government, thereby ending the state's monopoly in key industries such as energy and
telecommunications. Factory investment by foreign companies in Brazil is expected to grow to
about US$5 billion in 1995, double the US$2.5 billion invested last year. As a result, this year's
overall investment rate is expected to reach 21%, a level unparalleled in Brazil since the "miracle
growth" years of the 1970s. [Sources: El Financiero International (Mexico), 02/12/95; Spanish news
service EFE, 02/04/95, 02/05/95, 02/15/95; Inter Press Service, 02/01/95, 02/09/95, 02/13/95, 02/16/95;
Associated Press, 02/17/95; Notimex, 02/02/95, 02/05/95, 02/07/95, 02/14-16/95, 02/19/95; Voice of
America, 02/19/95; Reuter, 02/04/95, 02/14-17/95, 02/19/95, 02/20/95; Agence France-Presse, 02/13/95,
02/14/95, 02/16/95, 02/17/95, 02/19/95, 02/20/95, 02/22/95; New York Times, 02/16/95, 02/17/95,
02/20-22/95]
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